

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 069811  
ORIGIN NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00  
PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01  
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SIG-03 ACDA-12 OMB-01 TRSE-00  
AID-05 /115 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/AFN:TSWILKINSON:PAW  
APPROVED BY NEA/AFN:JKBISHOP  
H:RFLATEN  
L:JMICHEL

-----039538 180845Z /13

P R 180225Z MAR 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY  
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 069811

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, MO

SUBJECT: MARCH 13 MEETING WITH MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER  
BOUCETTA

1. BOUCETTA AND AMBASSADOR BENGELLOUN RECEIVED AMBASSADOR  
ANDERSON AND DEPTOFFS AT MOROCCAN EMBASSY MARCH 13 TO  
PURSUE DISCUSSION OF ISSUES OF LAW AND CONGRESSIONAL  
ATTITUDES THAT HAD BEEN RAISED IN WESTERN SAHARA ARMS SALES  
EXCHANGES WITH SECRETARY VANCE ON MARCH 11 AND 12.

2. BOUCETTA BEGAN MEETING WITH EXEGESIS ON DECOLONIZATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 069811

PROCESS, BEGINNING WITH TERRITORIAL AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE  
AND SPAIN IN SPRING OF 1956. MOROCCO HAD SUBSEQUENTLY  
REGAINED CONTROL OF TANGIER (OCTOBER 1956), TARFAYA (APRIL  
1958), AND IFNI (1969). REVERSION OF THESE TERRITORIES  
TO MOROCCO HAD NEVER BEEN DISPUTED. DECOLONIZATION OF  
IFNI AND WESTERN SAHARA HAD BEEN CALLED FOR IN SAME TERMS  
IN ONE UNGA RESOLUTION IN 1965. WESTERN SAHARA WAS ONLY

THE LAST OF MOROCCAN RECOVERIES OF LOST TERRITORIES, AND MOROCCO HAD FULFILLED TERMS OF TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT, UNDER WHICH SPAIN RELINQUISHED IT. THE AGREEMENT ITSELF WAS RESPONSIVE TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL CALL AT THE TIME OF THE GREEN MARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT IN ACCORD WITH CHARTER ARTICLE 33. THE "HISTORIC ALLEGIANCE" OF WESTERN SAHARAN

PEOPLES TO MOROCCO IN THE EARLIER ICJ FINDING WERE EQUIVALENT TO SOVEREIGNTY UNDER MOSLEM LAW, JUST AS IN FEUDAL LAW IN EUROPE.

3. CITING THE JEMAA VOTE AND 1977 NATIONAL ELECTIONS, BOUCETTA SAID HE HAD FOUND SAHARANS LOYAL DURING HIS PERSONAL CAMPAIGN EXPERIENCE IN THE TERRITORY AND NOTED THAT FOUR OF NINE SAHARA DEPUTIES WERE FROM HIS ISTIQLAL PARTY. SPAIN AND WHO HAD GIVEN IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF MOROCCAN SOVEREIGNTY IN RECENT AGREEMENTS THAT APPLIED IN THE TERRITORY AND/OR IN COASTAL WATERS. WHY WAS U.S. THE ONLY COUNTRY TO DRAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND ADMINISTRATION, AND TO LIMIT RECOGNITION TO THE LATTER? MOREOVER, IF THE U.S. COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE CONFERRED RECOGNITION OF MOROCCAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORY UNTIL IT MADE A DELIBERATE POLITICAL DECISION TO DO SO AND ACTED ON IT, WHEN AND HOW HAD THE U.S. ACTED TO RECOGNIZE MOROCCAN RECUPERATION OF TANGIER, TARFAYA, AND IFNI?  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 069811

4. DEPTOFFS ACKNOWLEDGED PERSUASIVENESS OF MANY OF BOUCETTA'S POINTS AND RECOUNTED REAL EFFORTS WE HAD MADE TO RESPOND FAVORABLE TO ARMS SALES REQUEST, BUT ASKED TO BE ALLOWED TO ELABORATE ON COMPLEXITIES WE HAD RUN INTO. ICJ HAD FOUND THAT MOROCCO'S HISTORIC LINKS WITH THE TERRITORY WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH SOVEREIGNTY; IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE AN EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF THE INHABITANTS. SPAIN HAD BEEN ADMINISTRATIVE CARETAKER FOR THE TERRITORY, AND THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT COULD CONFER ON MOROCCO NO MORE POWERS THAT SPAIN HAD. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, FURTHER MEASURES TO DETERMINE THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE HAD BEEN CALLED FOR IN THE UNGA RESOLUTIONS. CONSULTATION WITH JEMAA HAD OCCURRED AFTER CONFLICT HAD BEGUN AND ADEQUACY OF THAT CONSULTATION HAD NOT BEEN WIDELY ACCEPTED. WE HAD NOT EXPRESSED A POSITION ON THE ADEQUACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION STEPS TO DATE. QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER TERRITORY WAS ULTIMATELY A POLITICAL ONE WHICH COULD NOT BE RESOLVED BY LAWYERS.

5. WE ALSO HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS OF KEY U.S. LEGISLATORS, ON WHOM NOT ONLY SPECIFIC ARMS SALES BUT

THE ENTIRE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DEPENDED.  
THERE WERE FOUR GROUPS IN CONGRESS THAT WERE CONCERNED  
ABOUT THE USE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE SAHARA; ONE  
GROUP WAS SPECIFICALLY CONCERNED ABOUT SELF-DETERMINATION  
FOR THE SAHARANS; ANOTHER ABOUT THE EVIDENT RELUCTANCE  
OF MANY AFRICAN STATES TO RECOGNIZE MOROCCAN SOVEREIGNTY;  
ANOTHER ABOUT ANY U.S. ASSOCIATION WITH A FOREIGN WAR;  
AND A FOURTH GROUP WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE LEGALITIES OF

THE USE OF U.S. ARMS PROVIDED AS SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

6. IN LIGHT OF THESE DIFFICULTIES, AMBASSADOR ANDERSON  
AND DEPTOFFS STRESS NEED FOR MOROCCANS TO UNDERSTAND THAT  
CONGRESS MIGHT NOT ONLY ACT TO BLOCK SALES OF OV-10'S  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 069811

AND COBRA HELICOPTERS, BUT MIGHT ALSO PURSUE BROADER  
ACTION TO RESTRICT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM UNLESS  
MOROCCAN USE IN SAHARA OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE ALREADY  
PROVIDED BY U.S. WERE TO CEASE PROMPTLY. BOUCETTA SAID  
AT THIS POINT THAT MOROCCO WOULD RESPECT ITS AGREEMENT  
WITH U.S. BUT DID NOT STATE HE WAS ACCEPTING U.S.  
INTERPRETATION THAT, AS USED IN TEXT OF THAT AGREEMENT,  
KINGDOM OF MOROCCO EXCLUDES SAHARA. BENGELLOUN  
PLEDGED THAT ANY ARMS RECEIVED FROM USG IN FUTURE WOULD  
NOT BE USED IN SAHARA. VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** LAW, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, MILITARY SALES, US CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 18 mar 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978STATE069811  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** TSWILKINSON:PAW  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780120-0759  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780351/aaaabrdu.tel  
**Line Count:** 146  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 5c9e7cc4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ORIGIN NEA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 27 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3282544  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MARCH 13 MEETING WITH MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA  
**TAGS:** MASS, MO, (BOUCETTA, M'HAMED)  
**To:** RABAT  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/5c9e7cc4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014